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ABSTRACT 
 
The leading question in this paper concerns the reasons that may stimulate or 
hamper a wider diffusion of innovative technologies in the construction 
industry. The Strategic Niche Management (SNM) approach provides an 
evolutionary framework that is supposed to give a better insight into the 
reasons why new technologies may be successful or fail even though they 
promise superior performance compared to incumbent technologies. The 
SNM approach has been applied in a number of cases of innovative energy 
and transport technology solutions. The findings will be discussed by thriving 
on the theoretical backgrounds of the SNM approach and on literature 
describing the application of the SNM methodology in energy and transport 
technology cases as well as on the conclusions of the study on the application 
of it on the wider diffusion of an innovative prefab building system in the 
Dutch construction industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The construction industry everywhere still faces problems and challenges: 
globalisation, increasing competition, evolving new technologies, population 
growth, urbanisation, extensive need for housing and the need to reduce 
pollution substantially. A considerable variety of technologies has been 
developed and became available in the global market over the last decades. 
Innovations could help solving (some of) the problems faced by the 
construction industry. However the diffusion and implementation of new 
technologies is progressing slowly in the construction industry. Construction 
is deeply embedded in local laws, regulations, institutions and not in the least 
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place in long -established professional practices. Many technological 
opportunities are under-utilized. This happened to be the case with prefab 
steel housing systems in the Netherlands as well. In the quest for meeting the 
housing needs at a good pace the use of certain building materials such as 
steel as well as prefabricated building systems appear to have beneficial 
properties. Prefab steel structures have been developed and applied 
reasonably successful in de US, France and Japan. In contrast the prefab steel 
based housing systems in the Netherlands -developed after World War II- 
hardly took off. By application of the ideas of the Strategic Niche 
Management (SNM) methodology we make attempts to discover the reasons 
for this. In this paper we describe our study of the innovation trajectory of the 
Polynorm prefab steel system. The results were expected to be useful to find 
better ways of introducing and diffusing promising technological 
opportunities and thereby alleviate problems in the construction industry.  
 
THEORY / METHODS 
 
Extensions of the neoclassical theory (e.g., new growth theory) as well as alternative 
approaches have emerged over the past decades, in attempts to explain the 
phenomena of innovation, including the broad field of evolutionary economics. The 
evolutionary concepts have been applied in a diversity of attempts to improve the 
understanding and explanation of the rate and direction of technological 
developments. Also the Strategic Niche Management (SNM) approach rests on an 
evolutionary framework. It is supposed to give a better insight into the reasons why 
new technologies may be successful or fail even though they promise superior 
performance compared to incumbent technologies. The SNM approach thrives on 
the idea of technological niches and the possibility to manage these (Schot & Rip 
1996). The core concepts in the evolutionary framework are innovations and 
technological regimes within innovation systems. Innovation refers to the invention -
i.e. the development of new technologies (products and production processes) and 
knowledge- as well as to the diffusion (acceptation, adoption) and implementation of 
these. Inventions can either be the result of local R&D efforts, or they can be 
acquired from abroad through international technology transfers. After their 
introduction, the innovative technologies can be diffused within a community or 
between communities. A successful diffusion is taking place as soon as the 
invention is selected, accepted and implemented by companies or institutions, or by 
people by means of which the technology is dispersed into society. This spread is 
accomplished through human interactions; communication between members of a 
social system (Rogers, 1995). The more companies, institutions or people adopt the 
technology, the more widely it is diffused. Innovation or technological development 
takes place in on-going cyclic processes (Egmond 2001). The innovation cycle is on 
going, because new needs keep on emerging in every modern society, be it because 
of changing rules and regulations, demographic changes, technological changes, or 
other developments. Diffusion can be measured by the rate of adoption of (new) 
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technologies. A technology is more beneficial to more people if the ones benefiting 
from it can understand and adapt it to their (local) needs. Thus the technologies most 
adapted to local circumstances are the ones that are adopted most widely in the 
innovation system.  
An innovation system is the network of interrelated individuals, 
organizations and enterprises who share a common field of knowledge and interest 
in a certain domain. (Malherba 1999) It is the social organizational environment in 
which innovation takes place. The actors can be found at 1) international –; 2) 
national- ; 3) sector-; and 4) company- or project level. They behave following a 
certain Technological Regime. 
A technological regime (TR) is seen as a social construct -a pattern- made of 
knowledge, rules, regulations conventions, consensual expectations, assumptions, or 
thinking shared by stakeholders in an innovation system, which characterize 
professional practice and which guide the design and further the development of 
innovations (Kuhn 1962, Dosi 1982, Nelson & Winter 1982) Innovation theories 
point at technological regimes as key elements in diffusion, acceptation and 
application of new technologies. The theories also state the importance of gradual 
TR changes through interactive learning processes to maintain competitiveness as 
well as of the importance of the development and supply of complementary 
inventions, such as for example a need for institutional adaptations -in management, 
organization and the overall innovation system in which firms operate- when new 
technologies are to be adopted and implemented. Douthwaite (2002, p 75) stated in 
line with the above “Adapting the parable of the seed & the sower, a technology, 
however good it is technically, will only be adopted and prosper if it falls on fertile 
ground.” Thus an implementation and diffusion of an innovative technology will be 
successful if it fits in the prevailing and adaptive technological regime that 
characterizes the professional practice of actors in the innovation system. A regime 
shift is a significant, profound and irreversible change from one fundamental view to 
another, a different model of behaviour or perception (Nelson & Winter 1982). 
The SNM approach distinguishes a technological network, analogue and 
next to the social network in the innovation system. The technological network is the 
network of technologies in a certain domain in which the technologies serve a 
certain function. Nodes of the network are technologies. The position of a 
technology in the network is its technological niche in the domain. The idea of a 
technological niche means that a certain technology exists -or is developed- 
alongside other technologies, whilst it serves a specific limited domain of 
application. A technological niche is different from a market niche. The market 
potential - expected rate of return on investment- plays a role in technological 
niches. Like markets, technological niches are carried by networks actors 
(innovation system - the institutional framework-) and by a set of assumptions and 
expectations (technological regime). Promising innovative technologies are often 
undersupplied by the market because of high uncertainty, high up-front costs, or 
because the technical and social benefits are insufficiently valued in the market 
place. The SNM methodology promotes an interaction between the Actor and the 
Technology network. SNM aims for interactive learning and societal embedding of 
an innovative technology to bridge the gap between innovation and diffusion. From 
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historical evidence can be learned that innovative technologies often received some 
kind of protection and support from certain actors (niche managers), usually in the 
form of stimulating a particular market demand or by technology development 
programmes, which create a market niche for a fledging technology. Different actors 
in the innovation system may be the niche manager: policy makers, a regulatory 
agency, local authorities, a citizen group, private company, an industry organization, 
or a special interest group. The niche manager may be a person or a (newly founded) 
organization. Governments generally have a special role as a facilitator to stimulate 
that the diffusion and implementation takes place. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretic Framework 
 
The SNM methodology includes a number of sub-studies i.e. the analyses of 
(a) the properties of the innovative technology compared to the existing ones in the 
technology network by using the Technology Mapping Methodology (Egmond 
1999); (b) the actor network, its prevailing technological regime and potential niche 
managers by using the social network analysis methodology; (c) the current 
promoting or constraining factors of the context and the innovation system, that 
affect the adoption, implementation and further diffusion of the innovative 
technology in question. Based on the results of the analyses it will be possible to 
identify adopter groups and get a better idea of important market requirements as 
well as to identify a potential Niche Manager. By feeding back of the gained insight, 
strategies can be determined, that can be followed to stimulate the adoption, 
implementation and diffusion of innovative – and promising- technologies.  
The SNM methodology has been applied, verified and improved in various 
cases in the transport and energy sector, which acknowledge its validity. (e.g. Kemp 
et al., 1998, 2001; Hoogma et al., 2002; Lane, 2002; Raven, 2005; Geels and Raven, 
2006) From all these studies can be learned that the interaction between the Actor 
Network and the Technology Network are important in the innovation trajectory. In 
his studies Raven (2005) distinguished three interrelated interaction processes that 
lead to successful adoption of an innovative technology, which in fact come down at 
(1) strengthening the ties in the Actor Network and changing the Technological 
Regime by (2) “Voicing and shaping” the perceptions, expectations and valuation of 
Context 
Innovation system 
Actor network 
Technological network 
Market 
diffusion 
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the technology and (3) learning processes which enable a better insight and 
understanding of the technology (social embedding).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
An innovative technology for residential construction in the Netherlands 
in the past 
 
The case study 
Subject of the case study is the Dutch Polynorm building system developed 
in the period 1943-1952. It was a remarkable innovative construction 
technology, which comprises a lightweight prefab modular steel system 
composed of parts and elements that were to be assembled on-site into a 
variety of housing units. Although the Polynorm building system seemed 
reasonably suitable to provide a technological solution for the Dutch housing 
shortage in the prevailing situation at that time, it did not take off. Many data 
were collected by staff and students at the Eindhoven University of 
Technology, which we used in our study.   
 
Context  
The Polynorm system was developed to meet the extreme housing needs in a 
context of a severe scarcity of materials and financial means after World War 
II in the Netherlands. After the war the annual demand for housing increased 
tremendously to approx 70.000 units per year, due to the war destructions, 
the construction stop during the war in 1942, and an explosive growth of 
marriages and births after the war. However, the investment capacity for 
housing was rather low at that time. Concurrently there was a scarcity of 
construction labour, since the training and education programs had stopped 
during the war and the available workforce lost their skills and techniques. 
Moreover, other industries with innovative technologies were more attractive 
to young people. Before WW II there was no shortage of building materials 
neither was there a shortage of labour. Annual production of about 40.000 
houses per year matched the annual demand for housing due to population 
growth. Residential building construction could easily be financed.  
 
Technology systems for residential building  
Traditional building systems such as those commonly used before World War II for 
residential buildings in the Netherlands was labour intensive and took in majority 
place on-site by using masonry systems with burnt clay bricks with timber flooring 
and roofing systems. Building materials that came on site as manufactured products 
were bricks, glass, connection materials, hinges and ironmongery. Prefabrication of 
building elements – especially steel based parts- has already started, but only limited 
and in cases of scarcity of labour and material. Examples are the 10.000 houses 
which were built in the UK during the 1920s with the Dorlonco prefab steel system 
Egmond and Ligny: LEARNING FROM THE PAST: INNOVATION EVALUATED BY STRATEGIC NICHE 
MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY 
 
24 
 
and a prefab timber system in Sweden (135.000 houses in 1927). (Lichtenberg 2002) 
Although there was some experience with alternative prefab building systems before 
WWII in the Netherlands, they did not catch up due to stabilization of material 
prices and labour costs (Bouw 1948) After the war a variety of innovative prefab 
building systems were developed to overcome the housing backlog. Among these 
were Krabo, Bron, NV Systeembouw, Elementen bouw, Trabo, Bruynzeel, Duinker 
& Verruit, Daalbouw, Airey and Polynorm. Next to these prefab systems also 
monolith concrete construction systems were developed. The latter could ascertain a 
breakthrough at the end of the 1950s, thanks to the development of special 
formwork, such as tunnel forms, with which a reduction of 66% man-hours could be 
reached for wall and floor construction, provided that the houses are built in mass 
construction projects. (Blom 2004) 
 
The Polynorm building system 
The Polynorm system promised a high speed fulfillment of the extreme housing 
need of the Dutch lower and middle income population after World War II by means 
of industrialized (mass-) production and application of a modular lightweight prefab 
steel structure at lower cost.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Polynorm Building system 
 
The houses built with the Polynorm system provided functional spaces and 
integrated facilities in line with the requirements of the post war households and 
building regulations. The standard housing units built with the Polynorm system 
(comply, with the required minimal dimensions (Guidelines “Voorschriften en 
wenken voor het ontwerpen van woningen”, 1951).  The major properties of the 
Polynorm system are indicated in table 1.  
 
Table 1. Major properties of the prefab Polynorm building system 
 
Production 
& 
construction 
Industrialized mechanical engineering based production,  
High accuracy, low tolerance, relatively high quality 
Integrated elements for services 
Decreased production costs of building system   
Decreased on-site Construction time 
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Increased quality of building system  
Easy light weight on-site assembly 
Un-skilled on-site labour  
Decreased dependence from climate during on-site work 
Material use Functional and durable to reduce material and weight  
Cold rolled strip steel profiles (1-3mm) with rather low carbon 
contents, from scrap steel, in abundance available after WW2.  
Light weight steel frames (25% of the weight of traditional systems)  
Decreased dimensions of the foundation 
Exterior walls :prefab concrete façade panels fixed to columns, cavity 
with rockwool insulation (40mm) & interior asbestos sheets fixed with 
small aluminum frames to steel construction 
Separation walls prefab concrete panels  
Roof aluminum roofing sheets.   
Strength & 
rigidity 
In accordance with the building regulations 
Durability Steel system lasts at least 50 years (in reality even outlasted that period) 
Relative high level of corrosion resistance (by painting and muffling)  
Limited maintenance (specific façade construction & appropriate 
technical details).  
Fire 
resistance 
secured finishing with asbestos sheets 
Thermal & 
sound 
insulation 
In accordance with regulations in 1950. (cavity wall construction with 
50mm rockwool insulation)  
Impact noise abatement by means of soft board strips on top of the steel 
joists. 
Humidity 
resistance 
Weak does not meet the building regulations  
Humidity percolation and roof leakages after some time 
Functionality Spaces, dimensions and facilities according to building regulations  
Aesthetic 
quality 
Not directly in line with the conventional expectations.  
Primarily a consequence of functional and technical requirements.  
Alleviation of the housing shortage more important than aesthetic 
quality.  
System allows adaptation of building appearance to ideas of local 
architects and households by means of different finishings 
Costs Decreased total building costs possible thanks to construction time 
reduction 
 
The fact that rockwool insulation was not common by that time (1950 
certainly no obligation) can be considered as an extra quality of the Polynorm 
system compared to the traditional ones. A weak aspect appeared to be the 
Rainwater and Humidity resistance of the system.  
Provisions for services were included in the production process of the steel 
frames. The production of the steel elements had to take place with a high precision. 
The basic concept of industrialized prefabrication of the building components has 
been taken over from mechanical engineering based mass production processes. A 
prerequisite was a seamless connection between the different elements, which did 
not allow any tolerance. Production had to be adapted in communication with the 
on-site construction which took place by the Polynorm construction company with 
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un-skilled labour force on-site. The traditional contractor with his craftsmen 
disappeared from the Polynorm building site.  
Actor network involved in Polynorm housing projects  
Figure 2 illustrates the profile of the actor network such as it performed in housing 
projects with involvement of Polynorm. The thickness of the lines indicates the 
strength of the relationships amongst the actors. The actors indicated in italics were 
the actual decision makers for a project in the period 1945-1952. After 1952 the 
major decision making tasks were decentralized to the municipal authorities.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Actor Network 
 
Technological Regime (TR) amongst the actors 
The TR of the Dutch government during the post war years can be traced back in 
their policies, strategies and professional practices. The policy was focused at a fast 
post-war rehabilitation and industrialization towards socio-economic growth. For 
that purpose financial means were put at disposal for innovative building systems 
with which residential building projects could be carried out at a higher speed. The 
building systems should meet certain conditions that were safeguarded by advisory 
groups such as Ratio-bouw (construction quality advisory foundation). The latter 
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had a positive opinion about the Polynorm system and strongly recommended to put 
the system into practice with support of government financing of the R&D costs, the 
costs of a pilot project, the set-up of production plants and the execution of housing 
projects. In general, can be stated that at national level, government authorities were 
positive regarding the Polynorm system. However, the decision making procedures 
were rather complicated and time-consuming.  
The local authorities at municipal level had in the first instance a less 
positive opinion of the Polynorm system at least in the case of the Eindhoven 
municipality. Their opinion was based on the negative perception of the aesthetic 
quality of the houses. Moreover, the idea was that steel is ‘temporary’ and 
‘perishable’, since steel is subject to oxidation. On top of that they considered the 
costs of at least the pilot project too high.  
The perceptions and opinions amongst municipalities differed as appears 
from the fact that the Amersfoort municipality agreed on the execution of the pilot 
project in their city. Besides the establishment of a new industry in the 
neighborhood, that helps to alleviate un-employment problems in the region, could 
have given an additional motivation to approve the plans for the pilot project. 
The driving actors behind the Polynorm system were the inventors 
themselves, who were convinced of the quality and benefits of their product with 
which they could conquer the national and international market. They founded their 
vision on their perception that industrialization of the construction process could 
give a solution to the problem of fragmentation due to which construction failures in 
terms of cost en time overruns occur. To their opinion through industrialized 
construction production, construction and assembly could be carried out by one 
party, which completely finishes the building. By doing so it is possible to bring 
about (1) building at faster pace; (2) meeting the functional needs for housing of the 
population (3) achieving a higher quality through prefab assembly; (4) being in-
dependent of skilled workforce; (5) being independent of outdoor weather 
circumstances. They don’t mean that all buildings should look alike; rather building 
elements should be produced that are applicable to any type of building. Moreover, 
the produced elements should be compatible with the elements applied in traditional 
building systems. Failures of other attempts to industrialize the construction industry 
should have been based on a focus at single elements or components that are 
incompatible to their opinion.  
They founded the realization of their objectives on their perception that thin-
walled cold rolled steel is an excellent material to meet their ideas, which enhances 
the rate of accuracy in construction and reduces the dead load of the building; is 
beneficial for material utilization in the foundation as well as facilitates handling of 
the elements during on-site assembly. The practices of Polynorm can be illustrated 
by the division of tasks within the Polynorm group of enterprises in such manner 
that these correspond to the capacities of the management and their workforce to be 
able to manage and control the processes efficiently and effectively. This implied 
that the organizational structure was based on the primary processes (R&D, 
Production, Publicity, External relations and Construction/ Assembly) and the 
corresponding responsibilities were allocated to the divisions in question. In practice 
this organizational structure lead to a negative effect on collaboration between the 
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divisions. The cold rolling of steel technology (knowledge, skills and machines) 
were transferred from the USA, without any guidelines on how to use and maintain 
the machines properly. This implied a learning-by-doing process for the workforce 
that had to be trained for the job, which has been rather time-consuming at the start. 
Besides the production process was subject to great pressure particularly during the 
housing project at Eindhoven. Production and construction were not geared to each 
other, which resulted in delivery of in-sufficient, wrong or no material at all on site. 
Using un-skilled workforce on-site appeared to be impossible since – especially at 
the start of the housing project at Eindhoven- many adaptations had to be made to 
the basic elements to fit them together. Internal communication failed, much has to 
be organized informally, due to which the processes could hardly be controlled. 
External relations were limited to the national governmental institutions, some 
municipalities and existing ones such as with the Philips Company. Competition 
failures included project costs and delivery time as well as a lack of acquisition 
capacity. The latter became clear in Polynorm’s dependence on one party (the 
government) and their failure to anticipate on changes in the decision-making 
structure of the government. 
It must be admitted that there have been made construction mistakes or 
design errors in the past that have endorsed the opinion that steel is not an 
appropriate housing material. Historic tragedies with noise pollution, condensation 
and overheating still pursue steel. This leads understandably to suspicion, distrust 
and persistent prejudices. This is not only the case with consumers, but also in with 
contractors and construction companies.  
 
Table 2. Innovation trajectory of the Polynorm system 
 
1943 Idea 
1945-1947 1945 R&D prototypes 
1946 Establishment Polynorm Foundation 
Start networking  
Negotiations for financing factory + for financing Pilot project at 
Eindhoven &   Amersfoort  
1947 Start pilot project 4 houses Amersfoort financed by private funds 
and National  Recovery Bank 
1948-1949 • 1948 successful delivery 4 pilot houses 
1948 Establishment of 
Polynorm R&D company; (b) Dutch metal industry; (c) construction & 
assembly company 
1948-1949 Construction of production plant at Bunschoten 
1948 Philips & Eindhoven willing to investment in 212 houses at 
Eindhoven  
1949 Negotiations on housing project Eindhoven 
• 1949 Construction of 54 houses for employees near factory financed 
by Municipality & Polynorm 
1950 Building plans 212 houses at Eindhoven & specification approved 
Building permit issued 
Projected delivery date 31 dec 1950 
Start mass production steel frames 
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Start construction with unskilled labour by Polynorm Assembly 
company 
System needs several on-site adaptations 
• Delay delivery raw materials to factory  
1951-1954 Oct. 1951 delivery 20 houses  
Adaptations needed technical details due to water percolation in facades. 
Febr 1952 delivery 98 houses 
• June 1952 total delivery 212 houses 
 
1943 The idea for the Polynorm system came from Horowitz (mechanical 
engineer) employed as researcher by the Philips company (N.V. Philips 
‘Gloeilampenfabriek) at Eindhoven He was experienced in mass production of 
consumer goods and elaborated his idea in close collaboration with van Hulst Sr. 
(director Automatic Screw Works at Nijmegen), his son (director PWD at a 
municipality) and van Waveren (Philips mechanical engineer). 
1945 Direct after the war they started realizing their plans, established 
together the Polynorm foundation and investigated options at the cities Eindhoven 
and Amersfoort to carry out a pilot project of four houses (1946).  At that time the 
Dutch government had a program to stimulate post-war rehabilitation and 
industrialization for which financial means could be obtained under certain 
conditions. For project proposals that support rehabilitation this meant that they had 
to obtain the approval of the Construction Advisory Foundation (RatioBouw) as 
well as of the municipality in which the project is to be realized.  RatioBouw gave a 
positive advise, which was taken over by the Ministry of PWD and rehabilitation. At 
Eindhoven however the municipality rejected the application based on their 
concerns about the aesthetic quality of the houses and the costs of the project that 
included R&D costs.  
1947 The Amersfoort municipality approved the project thanks to the 
additional recommendations by RatioBouw to carry on with the project. The 4 
houses were successfully built (1947-1948) in majority with private finance (by v 
Hulst) and partly with finance of the Dutch government. The pilot project delivered 
quite some valuable information, which was useful for further development of the 
Polynorm system. (Polynorm 40 jaar, 1988).  
1948 After the pilot project the Polynorm inventors invited their relations – 
amongst whom the Philips directors, government officials and municipality 
employees- to show the success of the project and promote the Polynorm system.  
This stimulated the Eindhoven municipality and the Philips company to engage an 
architect to develop a project for 300 Polynorm houses at Eindhoven.  
In 1948 the Foundation Polynorm was transformed into the Polynorm 
organization that was composed of three individual enterprises: The Polynorm 
Development Company headed by Horowitz, The Dutch Metal Industry and the 
Construction Company Polynorm, headed by v Hulst (organization and acquisition) 
and vWaveren (production and construction). 
Two factory buildings (100 x30m) for Polynorm were built in the period 
1948-1950 at Bunschoten a location in the Netherlands with a relatively high un-
employment rate under a workforce, which easily could be trained. Both factory 
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buildings were built with a steel construction system; only the second hall was built 
with the Polynorm system. Polynorm houses (54) were also built in 1949 for 
employees near the factory; 38 financed by the municipality and 16 houses by 
Polynorm. 
The realization of the housing project at Eindhoven was not easy for 
Polynorm. They still had to convince the various stakeholders on the quality of the 
system. It has been Frits Philips who has opened the gateway to finally obtain a 
building permit for 212 houses to start the project in 1950. The construction process 
took about 2 years to finish the building of all 212 houses, which meant a time 
overrun of 1,5 year and a rather high boete.  
In 1952 the Dutch Government decided to decentralize the distribution of 
financial means for rehabilitation and housing projects and the authorized 
municipalities. Discussions and negotiations which were already in a far stage with 
the national government authorities to build5000 houses in various cities could not 
be continued. This occasion implied the final killing of the Polynorm organization, 
which was not well organized for large scale acquisition tasks.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although a number of external factors were due to this (e.g. problems in raw 
materials delivery) it is also possible to discover a learning curve in the trajectory of 
this project. Innovative production processes in the beginning often include 
necessary adaptations of various components of the process, such as adaptations of 
materials, equipment and tools, labour, information and documentation or 
organization of the work. Moreover, an innovative process also includes a process of 
learning by doing amongst all involved stakeholders. 
The Innovation Theories and the Strategic Niche Management approach as 
applied in the case study have resulted in valuable data. The innovative construction 
technologies that were investigated can be considered as a technological niche. The 
case studies indicated the promoting and constraining factors in the technological 
regime of the construction sector for the diffusion and implementation of innovative 
technologies. By means of SNM niche managers can stand up to intervene in the 
hampered process of diffusion and implementation of the innovative technology in 
the residential construction sector to fully benefit from its technical and social 
advantages.  
However, this is just a first step on a longer way to achieve a full 
recognition of an innovative technology among the major actors in an innovation 
system. Once the possible intervention mechanisms have been determined, then the 
feasibility of these including the dynamics between the different mechanisms should 
be thoroughly assessed. 
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